European Sovereignty Index

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The EU and its member states have much work to do to strengthen their technological sovereignty. They should continue to decisively regulate technologies and should greatly improve their capabilities in critical technologies.

This index defines technological sovereignty as the ability to shape critical technologies in accordance with the European Union’s interests and values. The EU would be technologically sovereign if it developed globally competitive critical technologies, regulated their dissemination and use effectively, and avoided excessive dependence on other powers for technologies that are essential to its economic, political, and societal well-being.

Indicators

In evaluating member states’ contribution to European tech sovereignty, the index focuses on artificial intelligence, big data, cloud computing, semiconductors, robotics, the internet of things, high-performance computing, advanced telecommunications, and cyber-security. This is because, in increasingly digitised economies and interconnected societies, these technologies play a fundamental role in economic and political development, have taken centre-stage in technological battles between great powers, and have generally been at the centre of European discussions on technological sovereignty.

The index measures member states’ technological capabilities using indicators including their contributions to research, patents, and standards; number of technology firms and professionals; companies’ market shares; venture capital investment in these technologies; and technology uptake. And it measures their commitment to technological sovereignty using indicators such as their positions on EU regulations and cooperation; engagement with international tech forums; participation in European research and development; contributions to the EU’s international tech initiatives; and polling data on public support for technological development.

List of indicators
Case 1: AI and data

Capabilities

  1. Number of AI research papers, per capita: in 2018-2020. Source: Scimago.
  2. Percentage of global AI patents, per capita: in 2018. Source: European Commission.
  3. Venture capital and private equity investment in AI, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  4. Number of venture capital-backed firms developing AI, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  5. Number of AI companies and number of AI start-ups in top 100 rankings, per capita: in 2021. Source: CB Insights.
  6. Number of AI professionals per million people: in 2019. Source: O. Groth, T. Straube, “Analysis of current global AI developments with a focus on Europe”, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2020.
  7. Percentage of enterprises that use AI: in 2020. Source: Eurostat.
  8. Percentage of global big data patents, per capital in 2018. Source: European Commission.
  9. Venture-capital and private-equity investment in big data, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  10. Number of venture capital-backed firms developing big data, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  11. Level of open data maturity (Open Data Impact and Quality): in 2021. Source: data.europa.eu
  12. Percentage of enterprises analysing big data: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s Digital Economy and Society Index.
  13. Venture capital investment in cloud computing per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  14. Number of venture capital-backed firms developing cloud computing, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.

Commitments

  1. Level and motivation of support for the EU’s AI act. Source: own evaluation based on assessments provided by ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  2. Engagement in international forums for AI regulation. Source: own evaluation based on ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  3. Share of people who believe there is a need for AI policy intervention: in 2019. Source: Eurobarometer.
  4. Existence of a mechanism for screening of FDI in data-driven technologies in the country. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  5. Cooperation with European Commission or other member states on FDI screening. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  6. Level and motivation of support for EU regulatory initiatives aiming to improve data availability. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  7. Share of people who are willing to share data if it can be done securely: in 2019. Source: Eurobarometer.
  8. Level of open data maturity (Open Data Policy and Portal): in 2021. Source: data.europa.eu.
  9. Existence and quality of AI strategy. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  10. Number of AI and cyber-related PESCO projects the country is involved in, per capita: in 2021. Source: EU Council.
  11. Participation in H2020 AI and data processing projects, per capita: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s CORDIS.
  12. Number of companies per country participating in GAIA-X, per capita: in 2022. Source: Gaia-X website.
Case 2: Digital hardware, infrastructure, and security

Capabilities

  1. Cyber-security capabilities according to International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Global Cyber-security Index in 2020. Source: ITU.
  2. Share of people who report being able to protect themselves sufficiently against cyber-crime: in 2019. Source: Eurobarometer.
  3. Number of high-performance computers (HPCs) per country, per capita: in 2021. Source: top500.org.
  4. Number of TOP500 HPCs built per country, per capita: in 2021. Source: top500.org.
  5. Global Market Share in HPC hardware, per capita: in 2020. Source: Statista.
  6. Percentage of global patents in micro and nano electronics, per capita: in 2018. Source: European Commission. 
  7. Accumulated paper contributions to three of the leading academic semiconductor conferences, per capita: 1995-2020. Source: J.-P. Kleinhans, J. Hess, P. Maham, A. Semenova, “Who is developing the chips of the future?”, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, 2021.
  8. Venture capital investment in micro and nano electronics, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission. 
  9. Number of venture capital-backed firms developing micro and nano electronics, per capita: 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  10. Percentage of global patents in robotics, per capita: in 2018. Source: European Commission.
  11. Venture capital investment in robotics, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  12. Number of venture capital-backed firms developing robotics, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  13. Percentage of global patents in the internet of things, per capita: in 2018. Source: European Commission.
  14. Venture capital investment in the internet of things, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  15. Number of venture capital-backed firms developing the internet of things, per capita: in 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.
  16. Telecoms market share, per capita: in 2021. Source: Dell’Oro Group.
  17. 5G patents, per capita: in 2021. Source: Iplytics.
  18. 5G standards contributions, per capita: in 2021. Source: Iplytics.
  19. Number of venture capital-backed firms developing connectivity, per capita: on 2015-2020. Source: European Commission.

Commitments

  1. The country’s position on Huawei/ZTE: in 2021. Source: Council on Foreign Relations.
  2. The country’s position on the EU 5G toolbox. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  3. The country’s self-assessed level of implementation of the 5G toolbox. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  4. The country’s support for strengthening EU member states’ cooperation in cyber-security. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  5. Cyber-security commitment according to ITU Global Cybersecurity Index: in 2020. Source: ITU.
  6. Share of people who are aware of the existence of official channels to report a cyber-crime: in 2019. Source: Eurobarometer.
  7. Commitment to additional spending on cyber-security in response to war. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  8. Commitment to additional EU cooperation in cyber-security in response to the war in Ukraine. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  9. The country’s position on EU connectivity development initiatives in third countries – such as the Global Gateway or Team Europe initiatives. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  10. Willingness of the country to contribute to connectivity development initiatives in third countries – such as Global Gateway – with additional funding. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  11. Participation in digital technology-related Team Europe initiatives: in 2021. Source: capacity4dev.
  12. Participation in H2020 4/5G projects, per capita: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s CORDIS.
  13. Participation in H2020 micro and nano electronics projects, per capita: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s CORDIS.
  14. Participation in H2020 robotics projects, per capita: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s CORDIS.
  15. Participation in H2020 internet-of-things projects, per capita: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s CORDIS.
  16. Participation in H2020 cyber-security projects, per capita: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s CORDIS.
  17. Participation in H2020 digital hardware, infrastructure, and security projects, per capita: in 2020. Source: European Commission’s CORDIS.
  18. Existence of mechanism for screening of FDI in digital hardware, infrastructure, and security. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  19. Cooperation with European Commission or other member states on FDI screening. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.

Results

Member states receive an average score of just 4.8, when weighted by population, in technological sovereignty. This is their lowest average score in any of the six domains in the index. But there are large differences between individual member states in the area.

Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden lead Europe with overall scores of 7.4, 7.1, and 6.8 respectively, while Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia receive scores of less than 3.4. The scores of more than three-quarters of member states are mediocre or worse, while those of more than one-quarter of them are ‘poor’. There is a distinct geographical divide in technological sovereignty, with northern countries performing far better than southern and eastern ones – with the exceptions of Estonia and Slovenia, which rank in the top third.

Member states perform better in artificial intelligence, big data, and the internet of things than in other technologies

Importantly, member states generally score significantly higher in commitment than in capabilities, with an average of 6.8 and 3 respectively. This reflects the reality that the EU is not at the forefront of global technological development in many areas but that, in recent years, it has shown a willingness to decisively shape the European technology market. The union now aims to increase its competitiveness and protect its interests in the area – even if this will be a lengthy process at best.

All EU countries receive higher scores on commitment than on capabilities, but this trend is especially marked in Slovenia, Cyprus, Greece, and Portugal. The difference between the two criteria is smallest for Sweden, Finland, and Ireland, which are all relatively technologically capable while also being deeply committed.

The most technologically capable EU countries are Finland, Sweden, and Luxembourg, which score 6.5, 6.2, and 5.7 respectively. Finland and Sweden both performed well in advanced telecommunications (4G and 5G) due to the fact that Nokia and Ericsson are global leaders in the field. Finland is also a strong performer in big data and the internet of things, and Sweden in cloud computing.

Estonia received particularly high scores in robotics and performs well in almost all technologies. Meanwhile, Slovenia is particularly strong in high-performance computing: it hosts two of Europe’s newest supercomputers as part of a pan-European high-performance computing project.

On average, member states perform better in artificial intelligence, big data, and the internet of things than in other technologies. They have significant weaknesses in semiconductors and cloud computing – which is why recent EU initiatives such as the Franco-German Gaia-X project and the EU Chips Act aim to improve European competitiveness in these technologies.

The countries that are most committed to EU technological sovereignty include Luxembourg (8.5), Finland (8.4), Slovenia (8.3), Cyprus (7.9), and Estonia (7.9). It is unsurprising that these smaller but relatively developed economies are committed to EU regulation and cooperation in technology, given that they particularly benefit from the union’s market and regulatory strength to compete globally. Estonia has made a particular effort to support the EU’s technological sovereignty agenda while also promoting its own international initiatives, such as Trusted Connectivity. Slovenia focused on digital sovereignty during its recent presidency of the Council of the EU. The least committed countries are Hungary (4.8), Romania (4.8), and the Czech Republic (5.2). Due to its openness to Chinese 5G technology, Hungary scores particularly poorly in its commitment to digital security.

None of the five biggest EU countries – Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland – are in the top third in this area. France (10th place) has particularly high scores in supercomputing due to the large market share of French company Atos, which is the only globally competitive European firm in this industry. Germany (11th place) performs relatively well in semiconductors as the home of Zeiss and Trumpf, global leaders in highly specialised semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and of Bosch and Infineon, which produce chips that have automotive and industrial applications. Spain generally has average scores in all areas of technology. Italy performs particularly poorly in cloud computing capabilities. And Poland (18th place) shows little interest in EU research projects in digital technology.

In all, the EU has much work to do if it is to strengthen its technological sovereignty. The union and its member states should not only continue to decisively regulate technologies, an effort to which most of them are committed, but should also greatly improve their capabilities in critical technologies – especially through the commercialisation of their research in almost all areas.